Memories of pan-Arab unity during the 1973 October War remain strong even 35 years after the event, writes Rime Allaf, Arab Media Watch adviser and Associate Fellow at Chatham House.
Syria Today
October 2008
In any discussion about politics in the Arab world, a majority of people will concur on the common maxim that Arabs can only agree to disagree. True to its clichés, the region has not only witnessed intense wars and dubious peace in the last half century, but also frequent disputes and reconciliations between "brotherly" countries over the most mundane of issues, while the notion of Arab unity, and even that of pan-Arabism, has begun to fade into oblivion as a mere footnote of history.
Whether this practical assessment of the potential of inter-Arab agreement was reached reluctantly or with conviction, it reassures some observers of the region who have maintained an enduring contrived effort to destroy this fragile notion of unity, even claiming that it never actually existed in the first place. For a variety of reasons, the negationists now openly ridicule the few remaining places where Arabist actions and discourse are still used, portraying them as mere dreams reflecting immature ideological aspirations that are inconsistent with the real Arab world.
There is regrettably some truth to such appraisals, but it does not help the critics' credibility that their own plans for a disjointed Arabia has been a major element in the projected demise of Arab unity, and that their long-term vested interests have rendered any attempt to conduct a common Arabist policy into mission impossible. Even if some Arab states were to try joining forces politically, the "divide and rule" default reaction (still highly effective, years after Anglo-French agreements partitioned the region) would come into force and doom the effort to failure.
Indeed, the mere notion of a movement that is both secular and nationalist in nature (especially one encompassing the entire Arab nation) stands in the way of many a scheme to control the region's resources, and various governments have gone to extremes to counter this inconvenient trend supported by the masses throughout the past century. Irresponsibly, colonial powers even promoted the rise of Islamism to counter the undesirable secular national movements seeking independence. Just as the British fought nationalist fervour in Egypt by encouraging the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and just as Israel tried to deter popular secular liberation groups in Palestine by facilitating the establishment of religious groups like Hamas, attempts at inter-Arab unity were offset with persistent measures that ensured breakdown and kept main actors segregated. Segregated and increasingly opposed to one another.
The Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, for instance, was to launch a multilateral peace process aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Instead, at Israel's insistence and with American acquiescence, the process was broken into multiple bilateral negotiations, allowing Israel to navigate between different tracks while never having to commit to a global solution or actually making the "painful concessions" it pretends offering for peace.
Nostalgia
There is a reason why the supposedly impossible inter-Arab harmony, à la EU, continues to attract so much attention. For all the disparaging and sarcastic references to Arab unity, and for all the denials about its current or previous existence, regional players know full well what Arab unity could achieve, especially when directed against the hegemony of Israel. And even within the "neo-nationalist" and the "neo-moderate" Arab groups in the region, who seem to find the Arab-Israeli conflict passé and the concept of resistance (in its many forms) to Israel distasteful, the lingering memory of Arabism’s power is enough to warrant concern: this old-fashioned zeal remains entrenched in their societies, appealing to a considerable segment of the population which would rather not see allegations about fake unity - and especially about a fake common cause - develop into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Even in states which have established ties with Israel, public opinion remains overwhelmingly reluctant, if not categorically opposed, to normalising diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, still considered a common enemy for the vast majority of people concerned with the Palestinian cause. In such circles, pan-Arab unity is not considered to be an abstract concept, but rather a proven strategic success that could turn the region's fortunes around.
That is why even 35 years after its occurrence, the October War (known worldwide as the Yom Kippur War, courtesy of the Israeli-dictated perspective) continues to provoke nostalgia in the collective Arab memory of unity, a memory formed by accounts of Arab achievements and not on the failure to regain occupied territory (especially after the urgent intervention of the US), a memory engrained even in the minds of those not yet born during those events.
On October 6, 1973, the tenth day of Ramadan, Syria and Egypt launched the joint military action that would trigger the most unexpected sequence of events and shatter a number of myths, including that of Arab powerlessness and of Israeli invincibility, demonstrating that Arabs could unite, and in doing so achieve great successes.
Although Israel had been warned by King Hussein of Jordan - in person - about the imminent attack, its arrogant refusal to believe that its Arab enemies could even attempt this feat made the attack easier and ironically maintained the element of "surprise". The Bar Lev line, a barrier of Israeli fortifications in the occupied Sinai which Israel had bragged was insurmountable and impenetrable, simply crumbled in a couple of hours under the force of Egyptian pressurised water guns. Prompt military advances were made on the Golan as well, as Syrian commandos swiftly took the most important Israeli stronghold on Jabal al-Sheikh.
Syria and Egypt were actively helped by a number of Arab states, which contributed troops, pilots, military equipment and logistics, not to mention moral and political support. When news of the war's breakout became known, tens of thousands of Arab men the world over rushed to Syrian and Egyptian embassies, putting themselves at the disposal of the relevant commands and offering financial contributions. Syrians and Egyptians of all ages cheered their armies, high on an adrenaline that the new Arab solidarity and "can do" attitude was spreading.
Most significantly, pan-Arab unity reached a new threshold with the unprecedented oil embargo: for the first time, Arab oil-producing states cut back production and refused to sell oil to the countries supporting Israel. While the actual effects of the embargo were minimal on the American economy and greatly exaggerated by media, the symbolic gesture was indeed enormous and retained a long-lasting shock effect, both on the intended embargo target and on the Arab people.
The patriotic euphoria which overtook the Arab world during those fateful days of October 1973 has mostly been forgotten, and the brutality of successive wars, invasions, and systematic Israeli attacks have rendered most Arabs emotionally exhausted and younger generations preoccupied with other priorities. Nobody is pining for war, especially when the reckless belligerence of the United States and its allies has created even more catastrophes and tragedies. And yet, perhaps because of these factors, spreading all across the Arab world is a distinctive nostalgia for a sense of solidarity in the face of injustice, and for unity in the face of aggression. While undoubtedly aspiring to a modern and increasingly Western lifestyle, many young people simultaneously find themselves drawn to the new rebels challenging imperialist superpowers and continuing to wave the flag of resistance.
The October War of 1973 is as significant to the Arab nation today as it was 35 years ago, and the enemy's obsession with breaking Arab aspirations to unify, in name or in deed, only serves to corroborate the importance of a common cause, and common goals. Like Nasser's daring nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956, the October War has left an imprint on the collective Arab conscience and memory, an eternal reminder that solidarity in the defence of the nation, however that nation may be defined, remains a universal value that crosses time lines, borders and generations.