By Rime Allaf, Arab Media Watch adviser and associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).

25 November 2008
Novosti - Russian News & Information Agency

There was much ado about very little last week, as British media covered the visit of Foreign Secretary David Miliband's visit to the Middle East. In particular, his trip to Syria was feted as an exploit of British diplomacy, with various journalists and analysts describing the event as a move to "bring Syria in from the cold" and to lead it back into the greener pastures of the Anglo-American sphere (also known as "the international community"). 
 
While a few reports reluctantly acknowledged that France had actually initiated the rapprochement earlier this year, this was apparently just "breaking the ice;" in other words, we are to understand that Britain is single-handedly bringing Syria out of its isolation, so long as the latter undertakes to tackle the usual set of demands. Speaking to the BBC, Miliband summed up his diplomatic stance with great precision, stating that Syria could be "a force for stability or it can be a force for instability."
 
This seemingly vague explanation is actually a fitting illustration of Britain's current political position, especially in the Middle East, and especially during this transitional period when nobody is quite sure how the new American president will conduct foreign policy. By the time President Obama gets settled in January 2009, the region will be expecting elections in Israel (February), in Lebanon (May) and in Iran (June), in addition to the provincial elections in Iraq scheduled for end January. While this would put many big decisions on hold, politics and bilateral relations have continued to develop while Britain was a mere spectator, and this might explain its eagerness to claim its stake in the regional pie. However, for the time being, it is unclear exactly where Britain stands, as demonstrated in its equivocal and hesitant approach.

It was of course France which broke ranks with a general American and European coolness, if not total freeze, towards Syria. Following Syria's contribution to ending the stalemate in Lebanon (leading to the Doha Agreement in May this year), President Nicolas Sarkozy invited Syrian President Bashar Assad to attend the Union for the Mediterranean Summit in Paris, and the subsequent military parade on July 14. Photos of Assad on the official tribune along the Champs-Elysées, and of the increasingly busy VIP lounge at Damascus airport, speak volumes about the definite thaw in Syria's relations with most European countries; Britain is merely trying to catch up with the rest, and media reports claiming a leading role (or reporting planned Anglo-Syrian intelligence cooperation as if it were a British concession) have bordered on the ridiculous.
 
France has even brought a new element into the equation with Syria: instead of pressuring it to cut its ties with the Iranian regime, Sarkozy has suggested using the good offices of Damascus as a conduit to Tehran, with which most still have trouble dealing. For three decades, the Syrian-Iranian relationship has survived a sustained Western effort to break the alliance (through sanctions and isolation) and to shift the politics of both regimes. Neither Syria's rapprochement with its critics, nor its on-off negotiations with Israel, have dampened the rapport, which only a radical change in either country would shift. 
 
While Syrian-European relations continue to improve, interesting developments in the relations with Russia have caught many observers' attention. During the so-called Russian-Georgian war last August, Syria was quick to position itself on the side of Russia and to describe the incident as a provocation from Georgia. While Syria's particular support makes no difference to a powerful country like Russia, it  nevertheless served to remind everyone of two major points: first, Russia's involvement in the region could make a difference and is wanted, and second, attempting to isolate Syria is delivering the wrong results.
 
There is a definite nostalgia in the region, on the popular level if not necessarily on the official one, for a return to the days of Russian involvement in the Middle East. The events of August were viewed by many in the region as being a typical American-backed enterprise to position a puppet for more power, and the response of Russia was mostly defended by Arabs, who saw similarities with their own predicament. (Even in the blogosphere, there was much solidarity with the Russian position, and much delight with the reported conversation between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his British counterpart, in which the latter was given a strong dressing down.)
 
All these developments cannot have been good news for countries trying to increase the limited influence to which they cling in the Middle East. Thus, caught between a French government which took a leading role and beat everyone to the front line, an American administration which has already pledged to rely on dialogue before other measures, and a Russian government which is being lured back into the Middle East, Britain wants to gain a foothold and to rekindle its relations with Syria, a country whose rising fortunes, and whose strategic weight, it has unwisely disregarded.
 
There is no doubt that Syria stands to gain from better relations with the UK, while knowing full well that Britain needs this too; simultaneously, Syria does not feel it excludes it from having stronger relations with Russia. What remains to be seen is the attitude of the new administration in the US, and how it may affect the changing political arena.