Barack Obama's election as president of the United States has raised hopes of a U-turn in US foreign policy that will undo all of George W. Bush's wrongs, but Syria should remain cautious about just how fast change will come, writes Rime Allaf, Arab Media Watch adviser and associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).

1 December 2008
Syria Today

This past November 4, as the longest day turned into the longest night, the world lived on Washington time and anxiously awaited the results of an election in which most people probably felt eligible to vote, so direct would its influence be on them. While the popular slogan "Anything But Bush" seems to indicate indifference about his successor, there would have been fewer global celebrations had the Republicans won the race, in spite of John McCain's efforts to detach himself from George W. Bush.

The collective sigh of relief let out with Barack Obama's victory was significant, and Syrians were amongst the first to celebrate the advent of an Obama administration which most feel will be more civil, more intelligent, more normal. But memories are short and political amnesia is dangerous, and there have often been too many dashed expectations from little-known elected officials. Given the history, it is difficult to believe that many Syrians had deemed the Bush-Cheney ticket preferable to that of Gore-Lieberman in 2000, simply because Lieberman happened to be Jewish and was expected to sway the president even more towards Israel. George W. Bush, on the other hand, came from proven stock, and perceptions of his father's engagement with most of the Arab world (with the exception of Iraq, of course), not to mention his audacious - albeit brief - stand vis-à-vis Israel, augured excellent prospects for the region. Unfortunately, this analysis never developed into reality, and Bush junior turned out to be much worse than expected, to put it mildly.

High expectations

While it would be far-fetched to imagine a repeat of the Bush administration's senseless exploits, it is nonetheless imprudent for Syrians to put all their eggs into one basket again, after seven and one long years of bad luck. More than ever, a thorough reading of the situation is necessary, and an appropriate action plan must be prepared to cover all eventualities and to ensure that proper communication is restored.

Causes for optimism are certainly plentiful. With his promises of hope and change, Barack Obama has practically sold himself as the anti-Bush, and his pledges to restore America’s moral standing in the world (with the closing of Guantanamo's Camp Delta, amongst other measures) are reassuring. While his initial priority will undoubtedly be that of the economy, he has campaigned with an exit plan for Iraq as well, and with the entire region in his sights for a comprehensive peace settlement - an ambitious goal which other presidents have attempted.

For Syria, in particular, the expectations are that Obama will restore full diplomatic relations with the appointment of a new envoy to Damascus, and that the attempted isolation will disappear from the agenda as engagement and dialogue become the basis of a new modus operandi. But are these basic actions, if indeed they do happen, sufficient to warrant optimism? Should he wish to, how much can Obama change course, and how much can he undo?

Pessimists - or realists - will find a lot of telling signs dictating caution. First, Obama's team already includes strong advisors or officials who are not exactly eager to court Syria. Second, Obama is bound by American legislation in his relations with Syria. Third, the new president himself may embark on different priorities and not be agreeable to impediments along the way. Finally, regional developments (and Syria's potential involvement in them) will influence the degree, and the timing, of Obama's propensity to change.

Back to the future

Team Obama is no maverick when it comes to foreign relations. The new vice-president is a long-time senator whose opinions on foreign affairs are easily describable as hawkish, especially as far as the Arab world is concerned. A self-proclaimed Zionist, Joe Biden's position on the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee has given more weight to a voice advertising not only staunch support of Israel (a given for powerful politicians), but also grandiose plans to partition Iraq into three separate states. Such positions affect Syria by default, and there is every reason to believe that Biden will not be a shy vice-president biting his tongue.

Syrian antennas should also register people like Rahm Emanuel, the new Chief of Staff, whose support for Israel translated into volunteering there during the Gulf War of 1991, or Dan Shapiro, advisor to the campaign and instrumental in the drafting of the Syria Accountability Act, or others like Dennis Ross, to name but a few. Last but certainly not least, there is the presence of Hillary Clinton (set to become Secretary of State as of this writing), who brings formidable clout to the Democrat circles and beyond, and who will be taking no prisoners in her quest to achieve a "legacy" - probably in the form of a Middle East settlement, very loosely based on the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002.

Obama is heralding change in many avenues, but his Middle East team so far is a reincarnation of the Clinton era; it's definitely better than Bush, but it's not as good as the Obama Administration many had come to believe would be a political "Dream Team" all fired up and ready to go fix the region's problems. Can Barack Obama really fix it? Yes he can, will confirm his lieutenants, but on his (and on their) terms.

A realistic means to an end

While many in Syria (and throughout the Arab world) have chosen to believe that Obama means change for them, a reality check is actually needed at this point. President Obama may well send an ambassador to Damascus, but this is far from being a "victory" of sorts over the Bush administration's pathetic diplomacy. For Syrian-American relations to get better, a mere return to the status quo in 2005 should not be considered progress. An ambassador and actual dialogue are the most preliminary of steps needed from Washington, and they should be considered as means to an end, rather than just an end in themselves.

Obama will also be bound by other restrictions: the Syria Accountability Act will not disappear with the last of the Bush remains, nor will the sanctions imposed on Syria through other legislation. In fact, sanctions have been part of US-Syrian relations since 1979, with Syria remaining on a list of states "sponsoring terror" regardless of the relative warmth or coolness of its ties with Washington. Before any real change occurs between Washington and Damascus, a long list of prerequisites will again be read and the usual demands will be made of Syria, which will have little new to offer itself. While everyone professes wanting to talk, there is little evidence that the conversations will differ much from previous ones, and the US will continue to stipulate conditions for upgrading the relation, under any administration.

President Obama will probably take his time before deciding on a new course of action with Syria. With domestic issues (especially the economy) and Iraq taking priority, with elections taking place in Israel, Lebanon and Iran in February, May and June 2009 respectively, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will be in a great rush to act with Syria - save for the replacement of an ambassador. Unforeseen events which trigger actions, and counter-actions, do not bode well and may dampen the enthusiasm with which Obama was first greeted, especially if he decides to act tougher than would have been expected, just to prove he can do it.

The Bush administration's "October surprise" was perhaps meant as a campaign boost for its favoured presidential candidate, or it may have been meant as a parting gift for a country it has sidelined needlessly. Regardless of the reason, the October 26 strike on Syrian soil, killing Syrian citizens, has created a new precedent and taken relations to a new low. It will take true diplomacy and a realistic understanding of each country's interests, from both sides, to undo the harm done by eight years of erratic and mostly futile provocations.