Q&A: Violations of international humanitarian & human rights law during Israel's war in Lebanon
By Victor Kattan, Arab Media Watch director and visiting fellow at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.
9 October 2006
1. What rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are applicable?
Determining what "intransgressible" rules of IHL apply to Israel's conflict in Lebanon depends on how the conflict is viewed.[1] If it is seen as an inter-state conflict between Israel and Lebanon, then a different set of rules would apply than if it were viewed as a conflict between a state and a non-state actor such as Israel and Hezbollah.
Most NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, have described the conflict in terms of the latter, and have argued that common Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War therefore applies (Article 3 is referred to as "common" because it appears in all four Geneva Conventions).[2]
In Hamdan v Rumsfeld (which concerned the legality of the military commissions established by the Bush administration to try Guantanamo detainees), the US Supreme Court held that common Article 3 "affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory 'Power' who are involved in a conflict 'in the territory of' a signatory."[3] It found that the term "conflict not of an international character is used...in contradistinction to a conflict between nations."[4]
In other words, it would be applicable to a conflict between a state and a non-state actor even if it takes place in the territories of more than one state, as long as it takes place in the territory of a signatory to the Geneva Conventions. The expression "not of an international character" used in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions means that its provisions can apply to conflicts between non-state entities and not only to conflicts between states - such conflicts are not beyond the law.
Common Article 3 provides in part:
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples…"
However, it is possible to view the conflict as an inter-state one (that is between two states, as opposed to a conflict between a state and a non-state actor). This is because Israel effectively declared war on Lebanon and targeted Lebanese soldiers and infrastructure such as airports, roads, bridges and tunnels. In such a situation, a more elaborate set of rules would apply which are set out in Articles 27-37 and 47-78 of Geneva Convention IV and in Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 (AP1).
In fact, Israel is on the record as holding Lebanon, Syria and Iran responsible for Hezbollah's actions. In a letter addressed to the UN secretary-general and the president of the Security Council, Israel's UN Ambassador Dan Gillerman wrote:
"Responsibility for this belligerent act of war lies with the Government of Lebanon, from whose territory these acts have been launched into Israel. Responsibility also lies with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, which support and embrace those who carried out this attack."
…
"Today's act is a clear declaration of war, and is in blatant violation of the Blue Line, Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and all other relevant resolutions of the United Nations since Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000."[5]
Gillermann then invoked Israel's "right of self-defence" under Article 51 of the Charter, which the International Court of Justice has interpreted to apply as only between states.[6] It is highly questionable, however, whether Israel's assault on Lebanon can be viewed as an act of self-defence, because under international law small-scale border clashes do not meet the threshold of what amounts to an "armed attack".[7]
Consequently, there is a case to be made that Israel committed an act of aggression contrary to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. According to numerous reports in the US and Britain, Israel's attack was premeditated.[8]
However, even if it was not planned in advance and even if one accepts Israel's self-defence justification, its attack could still be described as unnecessary and disproportionate to the initial attack by Hezbollah on 12 July 2006. Israel has a right to self-defence but not a right to "destroy Lebanon," as Lebanon's UN charge d'affairs described Israel's actions before the Security Council.[9]
If the conflict is viewed as inter-state in character, then common Article 2 of Geneva Convention IV would apply, which provides:
"…the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance."
Both Israel and Lebanon are signatories to Geneva Convention IV, and are therefore bound by its provisions as they have both ratified it.[10] There is consequently a strong case to be made that the whole of Geneva Convention IV is applicable to the conflict as between Israel and Lebanon, rather than only common Article 3.
The 1907 Hague Regulations would evidently be applicable to southern Lebanon, where Israel has stationed some 10,000-30,000 troops.[11] Were Israel to withdraw its troops fully and to cease exercising "effective control" in southern Lebanon, then of course the rules of belligerent occupation as set out in the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations would no longer be applicable.[12]
It should also be said that the belligerents are further bound by rules of customary IHL which is determined by state practice and opinio juris (in other words, the states have accepted that their practice amounts to law). The customary rules of IHL have been outlined in a recent study by the International Committee of the Red Cross based in Geneva, Switzerland, which is the guardian of the Geneva Conventions.[13]
Although AP1 is not binding upon Israel because it has not signed it (due to a clause granting 'legitimacy' to national liberation movements), those articles which reflect custom (such as Article 48) are nevertheless binding.
2. What rules of international human rights law are applicable?
Israel and Lebanon are both parties to the 1966 Covenants on Human Rights[14] and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[15] According to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the practice of the UN's former Human Rights Commission (which has now been replaced by a new UN Human Rights Council),[16] human rights law can also apply concurrently with IHL in situations of belligerent occupation, where the occupying power has effective control of the occupied territory.
The ICJ reached this conclusion in its Nuclear Weapons and Wall advisory opinions[17], and upheld this in its recent decision in armed activities on the territory of the Congo.[18] The European Court of Human Rights and the House of Lords have reached similar conclusions.[19]
3. What rules of international humanitarian and human rights law have Israel and Hezbollah breached in the 34-day conflict?
According to a report by Amnesty International:
"Israeli forces pounded buildings into the ground, reducing entire neighbourhoods to rubble and turning villages and towns into ghost towns, as their inhabitants fled the bombardments. Main roads, bridges and petrol stations were blown to bits. Entire families were killed in air strikes on their homes or in their vehicles while fleeing the aerial assaults on their villages. Scores lay buried beneath the rubble of their houses for weeks, as the Red Cross and other rescue workers were prevented from accessing the areas by continuing Israeli strikes…hundreds of thousands of Lebanese who fled the bombardment face the danger of unexploded munitions as they head home."
From the information made available by Amnesty and other NGOs,[20] it would seem that Israel is likely to have breached Article 3, 1, a, b and c of Geneva Convention IV if the conflict is not viewed as international in character, but if Article 2 is deemed applicable by a competent authority, then the following rules seem to have been breached (this list is not exhaustive):
● Article 33 regarding reprisals against protected persons and their property.
● Article 53 regarding the destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the state, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organisations where this is not rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.
Although neither Israel nor Lebanon are parties to the 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, some of its rules - as previously mentioned - have attained the status of custom, and are therefore binding. These would include:
● Article 48, which provides that as a basic rule the combatants should "at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives;"
● Article 51 (2), which provides that: "The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited;"
● Article 53, which prohibits "any acts of hostility directed against…places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;"
● Article 55 regarding the protection of the natural environment, which provides that: "Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage;"
In addition, it would seem that Israel was in breach of the following rules of international human rights law, from which no derogation is permitted even in times of public emergency (such as a state of warfare):
● Article 6 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights regarding the right to life, and Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides that: "States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life."
Since Hezbollah is a non-state actor and has therefore not signed any of the humanitarian or human rights conventions, it cannot be held liable for breaching them, although it is of course bound by customary international law.
In this respect, it would seem that Hezbollah did not respect the rule prohibiting attacks against civilians, but this may have a lot to do with the inaccuracy of the rockets they deployed, rather than malicious intent. British journalist Jonathan Cook, who covered the war from Israel, has written that it was not at all clear (as implied by the mass media) that Hezbollah was deliberately targeting civilians.
Apparently, Israel stationed many of its artillery batteries next to Arab villages in northern Israel to fire from into Lebanon. This may explain why a substantial number of deaths caused by Hezbollah rocket fire were those living in Israeli-Arab communities.[21] Therefore, Hezbollah could argue that they were attempting to hit military targets and that the civilian deaths, although unfortunate, were "collateral damage" (a term coined by America and Britain).
However, it must be clearly stated that whatever justifications might be advanced by Hezbollah, civilians must never be the object of attack. As Amnesty have pointed out:
"The fact that Israel in its attacks in Lebanon also committed violations of international humanitarian law amounting to war crimes, including indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, is not an acceptable justification for Hizbullah violating the rules of war, whether as a deterrent or as a means of retaliation or retribution."
"The underlying reason for the prohibition on reprisal attacks is plain: civilians and other non-combatants should not be made to pay the price for the unlawful conduct of armed forces …"[22]
4. Do any of the breaches of international law referred to above amount to war crimes?
They certainly could if they were committed as part of a plan or policy, or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes in its definition of war crimes the following:
• Willful killing;
• Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
• Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
• Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
• Taking of hostages;
• Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
• Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives;
• Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
• Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;
• Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
• Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law etc.
5. Is the use of cluster bombs prohibited by international law?
Cluster bombs are not currently prohibited by any international treaty. However, it could be argued that when they land on the ground and do not explode upon impact, they act effectively as anti-personnel land mines, which are banned by the 1997 Ottawa Convention.[23] However, even if one could make this argument, Lebanon and Israel are not signatories to this Convention (nor are Syria or Iran), and it is therefore not legally binding upon them.[24]
Having said this, the use of cluster bombs would have to be consistent with the rules of international humanitarian law. Were they to be deployed in predominately civilian areas, it could be argued that they would breach Article 48 of AP1 to the Geneva Conventions. It is difficult to see how one can make a distinction between civilian and military targets in such a situation (as opposed to their use against an army on the battlefield).
Cluster bombs pose a threat to civilians because they have a very wide area of effect, and they almost always leave behind unexploded bomblets. It would therefore seem that an army firing cluster bombs into urban areas is not making a distinction between civilians and soldiers.
The UN criticised Israel for using cluster bombs in its war in Lebanon because they were deployed in civilian areas towards the end of the conflict, when a ceasefire appeared on the horizon. Jan Egeland, the UN's humanitrain chief, said:
"Cluster bombs…have affected large areas, lots of homes, lots of farmland, lots of commercial businesses and shops and they will be with us for many, many months, possibly for years. Everyday people are maimed, wounded and are killed by these ordnance. It shouldn't have happened."[25]
Although the war has ended, Lebanese civilians, including many children, have been killed or seriously injured as a result of unexploded bomblets.[26]
6. Is the use of phosphorous shells prohibited by international law?
According to a report in the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, a commander in the Israeli army's Multiple Launch Rocket System Unit testified that they fired some 1,800 cluster rockets into Lebanon during the war which contained over 1.2 million cluster bombs.[27] According to the same report, Israel is alleged to have used phosphorous shells "which are supposed to be used by the IDF [Israeli army] for marking or setting fire to areas, in order to start fires in Lebanon."[28]
Opinion on whether phosphorous shells are prohibited by international law is divided. Some consider it to be a chemical weapon, while others disgaree. The Chemical Weapons Convention which entered into force in April 1997 outlaws the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.[29]
However, Lebanon and Syria are two of only eight states not to have signed the convention.[30] And Israel is one of seven states which has signed the convention but not ratified it.[31] Therefore, the convention is not binding upon Israel or Lebanon, the countries primarily involved in the latest conflict.
It could, however, be argued that the use of phosphorous shells violates the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW Treaty) as amended on 21 December 2001, particularly if they are used in civilian areas.[32] Protocol III on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons provides in Article 2 (1) that it "is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons."[33]
Incendiary weapons are defined by the Protocol as "any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target."
However, this would not include: "Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities."
Therefore, the question is whether phosphorous shells are primarily designed to set fire to objects or cause burns to persons, or whether they are designed to be used against military objects. Presumably this is a question for military experts on munitions, whose opinion on their legality is divided.[34]
Anyhow, it would seem that the issue is rather academic in the present situation, since neither Israel nor Lebanon are signatories to Protocol III to the CCW Treaty (nor is Syria, Iran or the US).[35]
It is worth noting, however, that Article 8, 2 b (xx) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides: "Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition…" may amount to war crimes, if committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.[36]
7. What is the likelihood of anyone being prosecuted for the crimes committed in Lebanon?
The primary legal instrument for prosecuting alleged war criminals was codified in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was signed in Rome (hence it is also referred to as the "Rome Statute") and entered into force on 1 July 2002.[37] It has, however, not been signed by Israel or Lebanon.[38]
Israel objected to the Statute because it defines as a war crime "the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies," which would obviously cover Israel's settlements policy.[39] In explaining Israel's vote on the adoption of the Statute, Judge Eli Nathan said:
"…we have been obliged to cast our vote against the Statute as a whole, because we have been permitted no other means of formally expressing our frustration at this politicization of the Statute and the Court."[40]
Hezbollah cannot be party because it is not a state, although its leaders could be prosecuted if they are arrested in the territory of a signatory state (or on board a signatory state's vessel or aircraft), as could Israeli nationals implicated in war crimes.
Article 29 of the UN Charter provides the Security Council with the power to "establish subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." It could therefore establish ad-hoc war crimes tribunals, as it did in the case of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia[41] (in The Hague, the Netherlands) and for Rwanda[42] (in Arusha, Tanzania).
However, since the Council depends on the concurring votes of its permanent members (China, Russia, France, Britain and the US), a negative vote by one of them would suffice to render this provision obsolete.[43]
It may also be possible to prosecute persons implicated in war crimes under the municipal law of various states through the doctrine of universal criminal jurisdiction. This allows a state to try suspected war criminals on its territory even if the crimes did not occur there or affect its nationals.
However, it is usually the case that a state will only attempt to exercise such jurisdiction if a suspect is present on its territory. Exercising universal jurisdiction in absentia (that is, without the presence of the accused) is very controversial, as demonstrated by the 2001 Belgian court case against Israel's former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for crimes committed in Beirut in 1982.[44]
No Israeli or Lebanese national has ever been prosecuted for war crimes in the courts of a third state. In 1991, Lebanon pardoned most of the soldiers and militia leaders who were suspected of committing war crimes during the 1975-1990 civil war, in a much criticised amnesty.
Israel has robustly defended its soldiers and warned them against traveling to countries where they may be subject to prosecution. In September 2005, Major-General Doron Almog narrowly escaped arrest at Heathrow airport for war crimes allegedly committed in the Gaza Strip in 2002 when he was head of the Israeli army's Southern Command.[45]
Time will only tell whether anyone gets prosecuted for the crimes committed in Lebanon in the summer of 2006.
[1] The International Court of Justice held that the Hague and the Geneva Conventions "are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law." See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996 at para. 79. The opinion is available at the ICJ's website: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm
[2] See Questions and Answers on Hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, Human Rights Watch, 2 August 2006, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/17/lebano13748.htm
[3] See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-184.ZO.html#63ref
[4] Ibid.
[5] See UN doc. A/60/937 S/2006/515, 12 July 2006.
[6] See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, para. 139, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm
[7] In Nicaragua v United States of America, the ICJ ruled that "the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such operation because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces." See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment-Merits (June 27, 1986), para. 195 which is available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusframe.htm
[8] See Seymour M. Hersh, "Watching Lebanon", The New Yorker, (August 21, 2006), www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060821fa_fact and John Kampfner, "Blood on his hands", New Statesman, 7 August 2006, pp. 12-14.
[9] See UN Doc. A/60/941 S/2006/529, 17 July 2006
[10] For a list of States parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols see:
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/party_gc/$File/Conventions%20de%20Geneve%20et%20Protocoles%20additionnels%20ENG.pdf
[11] In this respect see HCJ 593/82, Leah Tsemel, Attorney, et al v. Minister of Defence and Commander of the Ansar Camp (1983) Piskei Din, Vol. 37, part 3, pp. 365-380 in Hebrew. Translated into English and reprinted in 1 Palestine Yearbook of International Law (1984), pp. 164-174. The Court held that: if the army has taken actual and effective control of territory "X", the temporariness of its stay on the territory or its intention to maintain only temporary military control does not detract from the reality that de facto conditions have been created compelling application of those ordinances of the laws of war relating to the consequences of belligerent occupation. Furthermore, application of the third chapter of the Hague rules or of the parallel provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention is not dependent on the establishment of a special organizational apparatus bearing the character of a military administration."
[12] Ibid.
[13] See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louis Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1 Rules (ICRC: Cambridge University Press 2005).
[14] See http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm
[15] See http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm
[16] See UN General Assembly resolution 60/251, 3 April 2006.
[17] See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paras. 107-113.
[18] See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda), 19 December 2005, paras. 215-221
[19] See See Loizidou v Turkey (merits and just satisfaction, 28 November 1996) 40/1993/435/514 available on HUDOC at para. 56. See also the decision as to the admissibility of Bankoviæ v Belgium and 16 other contracting parties, Application no. 52207/00, 43 International Legal Materials (2002), p. 517, paras. 70-71; and The Queen (on the application of Mazin Mumaa Galteh Al Skeini and Others) and The Secretary Of State for Defence, in the Supreme Court of the Judicature Court of Appeal (Civil Division) on Appeal from the Administrative Court Divisional Court, [2004] EWHC 2911 (admin), 21 December 2005. This is available online at: www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/1609.rtf. See, in particular, Lord Justice Sedley’s concurring opinion at paras. 191-197 where he disagrees with the leading judgment of Lord Justice Brooke.
[20] Human Rights Watch in their statement submitted to the second special session of the UN Human Rights Council alleged: "The Israel Defense Forces have consistently blurred the distinction between civilians and combatants. Israeli government officials have argued that after Israel ordered civilians to evacuate southern Lebanon, only people associated with Hezbollah remain, and thus are legitimate targets of attack. Under international law, however, only civilians directly participating in hostilities lose their immunity from attack. Many civilians have been unable to flee because they are sick, wounded, do not have the means to leave, are providing essential civil services, or lack a safe route for their departure. HRW has documented 27 deaths that resulted when civilians came under attack as they attempted to flee southern Lebanon, as well as two Israeli air strikes on humanitarian aid vehicles."
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6SJRC2?OpenDocument
[21] See http://www.arabmediawatch.com/amw/Articles/Analysis/tabid/75/newsid395/3091/How-Human-Rights-Watch-lost-its-way-in-Lebanon/Default.aspx
[22] See Under Fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel, AI Index: MDE 02/025/2006, 14 September 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE020252006
[23] See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm
[24] For State's signatories see http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members
[25] See "Israel's 'immoral' use of cluster bombs in Lebanon poses major threat – UN aid chief" UN News Centre, 30 August 2006
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19670&Cr=Leban&Cr1
[26] See, for instance, the story of Hassan Hemadi, "Victim of Lebanon Cluster Bombs" by Tom Parry
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/tm_objectid=17767403%26method=full%26siteid=94762%26headline=exclusive%2d%2dvictim%2dof%2dthe%2dlebanon%2dcluster%2dbombs-name_page.html
[27] "When rockets and phosphorous cluster", Ha'aretz, 13 September 2006:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/761910.html
[28] Ibid.
[29] See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction:
http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.html
[30] http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_nonsig.html
[31] http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_sig.html
[32] This is available at:
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/40BDE99D98467348C12571DE0060141E/$file/CCW+text.pdf
[33] See Protocol III on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B409BC0DCFA0171CC12571DE005BC1DD/$file/PROTOCOL+III.pdf
[34] For general information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_phosphorus#Arms_control_status
[35] For state's signatories see:
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039CB0C?OpenDocument
[36] For the Rome Statute, see
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf#search=%22rome%20statute%20icc%22
[37] Ibid.
[38] For a list of signatories see http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures
[39] See Article 8. 2 (b) viii of the Rome Statute, supra, note. 36.
[40] See http://www.amicc.org/docs/Israel7_17_98.pdf
[41] See UN Security Council resolution 827, 25 May 1993, at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement.
[42] See UN Security Council resolution 955, 8 November 1994, at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement
[43] See Article 27 (3), UN Charter, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch-chp5.htm
[44] See the complaint lodged by the survivors against "Messrs. Ariel Sharon, Amos Yaron, and other Israelis and Lebanese responsible for the massacre, killing, rape, and disappearance of civilians that took place in Beirut between Thursday 16 and Saturday 18 September 1982 in the camps of Sabra and Chatila and the surrounding area" at www.indictsharon.net/cmptENen.pdf
[45] See Hickman & Rose Press Release: http://www.hickmanandrose.co.uk/news06.html