Saturday, October 11, 2008 You are here: Country Backgrounds > Palestine > Israel's Wall > The Wall and the Gaza Disengagement Plan Printer Friendly Page
Register | Login
 Search



Minimize The Wall and the Gaza Disengagement Plan

Israel's Wall and the Gaza Disengagement Plan

 

By Arab Media Watch director Victor Kattan

 

According to the Israeli Cabinet’s revised "disengagement plan”, the Israeli military is to “redeploy outside the Strip”, though it will not redeploy from the area between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (see chapter 2, section A, part 3.1.1).

 

It would therefore be more accurate to refer to the plan as the qualified-revised "military redeployment plan”.

 

Journalists should make efforts to ascertain the true nature of the enterprise that is taking place today in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More effort should be made to scrutinise the information that is already publicly available. It is not difficult to spot the fallacies in Israel's redeployment plan. In fact, the first major area of concern is on the first page of this document at chapter 1, para. 3:

 

“In any future permanent status arrangement, there will be no Israeli towns and villages in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State of Israel, including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and villages (i.e. illegal Israeli settlements), security areas and other places of special interest to Israel”.

 

Most correspondents correctly state that Palestinians are worried that Israel is redeploying from Gaza in order to annex parts of the West Bank. But one wonders why journalists need to say that “the Palestinians are worried” when it is evident that they should be. Instead, journalists could point out that Palestinian fears are well founded, since the plan itself expressly states that Israel is going to keep all the settlements in the West Bank apart from four tiny outposts (Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh) in the north of the West Bank.

 

According to chapter 2, section B, of the redeployment plan: “The State of Israel will continue building the Security Fence”. Although this version of the redeployment plan was published before the International Court of Justice rendered its opinion on the illegality of the Wall, Israel is still building it in express violation of its commitments, responsibilities and obligations under international law.

 

Nabil Elaraby, the Egyptian Judge at the ICJ, was of the view that it would have been appropriate “to refer to the implications of the letter of the Prime Minister of Israel and its attachments [regarding the disengagement plan] and to underline that what it purports to declare is a breach of Israel’s obligations and contrary to international law”.

 

Israel's statement in chapter 1, para. 6, also on the front page of the redeployment plan, smacks of imperial hubris. It is sheer arrogance to say that “[t]he completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip”, when it certainly will not.

 

It is not up to Israel to decide if and when it is responsible or not for territory that is under its effective control. This depends on the facts on the ground.

 

Under international law, this is the test (effective control) to determine who occupies territory. As a Policy Brief on Israel's redeployment plan, prepared by the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (part of the International Humanitarian Law Initiative), notes at page 6:

 

“The test is not per se the military presence of the occupying forces in all areas of the territory, but the extent to which the Occupying Power, through its military presence, is exerting effective control over the territory and limiting the right of self-determination of the occupied population”.

 

The reality is that Israel will continue to exercise effective control in Gaza once some its troops have redeployed to the perimeter (which is already surrounded by a barrier). This can be ascertained from the following:

 

Chapter 2, part A, section 3.1:

 

“1) The State of Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli towns and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip. This will not include military redeployment in the area of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt ("The Philadelphi Route") as detailed below”.

 

Chapter 2, part B, section 3:

 

“1. The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip”.

 

“3. The State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defence, both preventative and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the Gaza Strip”.

 

Chapter 2, part B, section 5:

 

“… No foreign security presence may enter the Gaza Strip and/or the West Bank without being coordinated with and approved by the State of Israel”.

 

Moreover, Israel will continue to exert control over the Palestinian economy, including fiscal policy, and trade (see chapter 2, part B, section 8). The New Israeli Shekel will remain legal tender; foreign employment, migration, and access to specialised health care will be controlled by Israel. It could be argued that the redeployment plan is Israel's latest attempt at perfecting the art of occupation by deploying some of its troops from Gaza (apart from the so-called Philadelphi Route), while exerting control over everyday aspects of Palestinian life (access to water, gas, petrol and electricity).

 

On 17 June, the BBC carried a report that “Israel is planning to build a sea barrier as an extension of its border with Gaza to prevent attackers from entering the country from the sea”. Although this barrier is being built on Israeli territorial waters, rather than in Occupied Territory (according to BBC correspondent Alan Johnston), it is further evidence of Israel’s ability to exercise effective control over Gaza. According to the same report:

 

Israeli army officials said the measure would compensate for Israel's loss of surveillance once it pulls out of the Gaza Strip later this year”.

 

It would seem that Israel wants to relieve itself of its responsibilities under international law, granting Palestinian residual autonomy whilst maintaining overall control. Sceptics might think that Israel's military redeployment plan is simply a ruse; a guise wrapped up as part of a non-existent “peace process”; a pretence designed to placate the international community. But the occupation is not over; it will just enter a new phase. Israeli troops will remain in the West Bank. After all, the Gaza Strip merely accounts for 1.25% of mandatory (historic) Palestine.

 

Israel's redeployment plan is inconsistent with its international obligations, set out in UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and resolutions on the illegality of settlement activity in Occupied Arab Territories. The totality of the redeployment plan (for one should not just focus on Gaza but also on what is happening in the rest of the Occupied Territories) expressly violate Israel's obligations under the Road Map regarding the viability and contiguity of a Palestinian State, which was endorsed in Security Council resolution 1515.

 

For further reading:

 

See Mushtaq Husain Khan, George Giacaman and Inge Amundsen, State Formation in Palestine: viability and governance during a social transformation (RoutledgeCurzon 2004), in particular chapter 3 by Adel Zagha and Husam Zomlot on the Paris Economic Protocol at pp. 120 - 140, and chapter 6 by Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Adel Zagha on taxation at pp. 192 - 214.

 

See the “disengagement plan” on the web site of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office at http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/DisengagemePlan/

 

See Nabil Elaraby, Separate Opinion, para. 2.5. This is available at:

http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm

 

See "Legal Aspects of Israel's Disengagement Plan under International Humanitarian Law", a Policy Brief by the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, at pp. 6. You can read this brief (PDF file) at the following link:

 http://www.ihlresearch.org/opt/pdfs/briefing3466.pdf

 

SeeIsrael to build Gaza Sea Barrier” on BBC News at the following link:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4104774.stm

 


       
Copyright (c) 2003-2007 Arab Media Watch  | Terms Of Use | Privacy Statement