North-South Peace Deal

North-South Peace Deal

North-South Civil Wars

The Oil Factor

Peace Agreements

Progress So Far

North-South Civil Wars

First Civil War

The first Sudanese civil war lasted 17 years (1955-1972). The British failure to ensure equity for both the north and south in the Sudanese civil service and administration contributed to the impasse. The Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by the Equatoria corps in Torit.

Rather than surrender to Sudanese government authorities, many mutineers disappeared into hiding with their weapons, marking the beginning of the first war in southern Sudan. By the late 1960s, the war had resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people. Several hundred thousand southerners went into hiding in the forests, or escaped to refugee camps in neighbouring countries.

By 1969, the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain weapons and supplies. Israel trained the Anya Nya, a south-Sudanese separatist movement, and shipped weapons via Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels.

The Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels and international arms dealers with monies collected in the south and from among southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe and North America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment and supplies from government troops.

Militarily, the Anya Nya controlled much of the southern countryside, while government forces occupied the region’s major towns. The guerrillas operated at will from remote camps.

In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of southern forces opposed to Khartoum, proclaimed the creation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. Anya Nya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians supported the SSLM. Although it created a governing infrastructure throughout many areas of southern Sudan, real power remained with Anya Nya, with Lagu at its head.

In October 1971, Khartoum established contact with the SSLM. In February 1972, a conference was convened at Addis Ababa in Ethiopia under the auspices of its Emperor Haile Selassie. The Addis Ababa Accords were signed between Khartoum and the SSLM on 27 March 1972.

The accords guaranteed autonomy for a southern region composed of the three provinces of Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal and Upper Nile under a regional president appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly.

The High Executive Council named by the regional president would be responsible for all aspects of government in the region with the exception of defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, economic and social planning, and interregional concerns.

Southerners, including qualified Anya Nya veterans, would be incorporated into a 12,000-man southern command of the Sudanese army under equal numbers of northern and southern officers.

The accords recognised Arabic as Sudan’s official language, and English as the south’s principal language, which would be used in administration and would be taught in schools.

Second Civil War

The second Sudanese civil war lasted 22 years, from 1983 until the signing of the north-south peace deal on 9 January 2005. In September 1983, President Gaafar al-Nimeiri announced his decision to incorporate traditional Islamic punishments drawn from sharia law into the penal code. This measure triggered a general protest among the animists and Christians in the south, and recharged the guerilla movement.

That year a revolt broke out in the city of Bor, where the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, a body created by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, arose with the objectives of achieving national unity and socialism, while respecting southern autonomy and religious freedom.

In the north, al-Nimeiri was severely criticised by the Muslim Brotherhood and opposition parties for using sharia as a tool for repressing dissidents. The financial community also exerted pressure on the Sudanese president to limit the application of sharia law in business, as it stood in opposition to International Monetary Fund policies.

By 1984, Sudan’s external debt reached $8 billion, and the following year the US suspended all credit. The IMF forced the government to raise food prices, which led to rebellion. Al-Nimeiri visited the US in search of financial backing. In his absence there was a coup and Rahman Suwar al-Dahab, the minister of defence and army chief of staff, seized power. Despite the coup, the war between the north and south continued.

In April 1986 Sadiq al-Mahdi, from the Party of the People (UMMA), based on the Koran and Islamic tradition, was elected prime minister. Thirty-seven representatives were not elected because of the war in the south.

The SPLM’s 12,000 guerillas besieged government garrisons in the south, practically splitting Sudan in two. The south suffered from food shortages as a result of an insurgent blockade. However, the guerillas agreed to let through airborne food and medical supplies sent by the UN.

In 1989, foreign debt reached $12 billion. In June, Major-General Omar al-Bashir ousted the president, blaming his government for the political and economic crisis. Al-Bashir dissolved political parties and created a 15-member military junta, promising to end the civil war.

On 31 January 1991, al-Bashir’s government introduced a new criminal code based on sharia that would only be implemented in the north, where Islam is predominant.

In 1991-1992, Bashir’s government almost lost control of Sudan. John Garang’s SPLA, operating in the south, and Riak Mashar’s Nasir rebel group (a splinter of the SPLA) proved particularly effective. Khartoum responded harshly against its opponents in urban areas, and against rural communities which supported the guerillas in the countryside.

Negotiations were held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 1992. International pressure forced al-Bashir to revoke the ban on airplane movements to the south, which had kept food and medicine from being transported. In February 1992, 60,000 people died of hunger in the city of Parayang.

In February 1993, the SPLA and Khartoum resumed negotiations in Entebbe, Uganda. However, disagreement between Garang and al-Bashir over the devolution of power to the provinces caused the talks to flounder in June 1993.

Three years later, al-Bashir was reelected with 76% of the vote. Meanwhile, the war continued until 9 January 2005. In that time it claimed the lives of 2 million people, displaced more than 4 million people, and inflicted long-term damage to Sudan’s infrastructure and environment.

References:

The World Guide: An Alternative Reference to the Countries on our Planet 2001/2002 (Oxford: New Internationalist Publications 2001)

Globalsecurity.org (Civil War 1)

Globalsecurity.org (Civil War 2)

For a chronology, visit Human Rights Watch

For human rights documentation, click here

For Amnesty International info on Sudan click here.

Africaaction.org

For information on the SPLA, click here.

The Oil Factor

In 1998, Khartoum began constructing an oil pipeline from the south of the country to the Red Sea. Sudan’s vast oil reserves, first discovered by Chevron in 1980, are located in the centre and south of the country. According to a 2001 report by Christian Aid:

“Since construction of the pipeline to the Red Sea began in 1998, hundreds of thousands of villagers have been terrorised into leaving their homes in Upper Nile. Tens of thousands of homes across Western Upper Nile and Eastern Upper Nile have been burnt to the ground. In some areas, the charred remains of the humble mud huts that got in the way of oil are the only evidence there is that there was ever life in the region.”

The war therefore became no longer simply a north-south dispute. Oil made it more complicated. In the late 1990s, Khartoum adopted a “divide-and-rule” policy in the south, fomented by strategic arms deliveries from government garrisons.

In 2000, Khartoum delivered hundreds of cases of ammunition to one of the southern factions fighting for control of the Western Upper Nile and its oil reserves. Christian Aid called this “warlordism,” which it says was provoked and encouraged by the government with the express intent of depopulating oil-rich areas.

Oil companies such as Canada’s Talisman Energy, Sweden’s Lundin Oil, Malaysia’s Petronas and China’s state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (British Petroleum is an institutional investor in PetroChina, a subsidiary of CNPC) are business partners of the government of Sudan. Under contract, oil revenues are shared between the companies and the Sudanese national oil company Sudapet. As Christian Aid notes:

“Military protection is also part of the partnership. As in many conflict-ridden countries, the oil companies are themselves targets. The SPLA has declared oilfields and oil companies to be legitimate military targets; one of its local commanders has attacked oil installations …

The companies require protection so that they may operate unhindered and so their staff are secure. But the relationship between oil and security has moved far beyond simple defence. A strategy of clearing potential enemies – Nuer and Dinka civilians – from the oilfields is seen by the government as a prerequisite to making way for oil.”

There has always been dissension in the SPLA between the Dinka and Nuer groups, but the rivalry was exploited by the government, which armed proxy forces to fight its battles, including both Arab and southern militias. The warlords, who were encouraged to develop, were often only loosely aligned and operated in isolation. None of the protagonists respected the rights of civilians, and all sides were accused of committing atrocities.

According to a report by Amnesty International, by the turn of the 21^st century “more people have lost their lives in inter-factional fighting amongst Southerners than in armed encounters with government forces.”

This stage of the war, which now accounted for the majority of casualties, was being fought between various militias allied with the government or the SPLA. As Amnesty noted in its report “The Human Price of Oil”:

“These forces frequently change sides depending on their perceived interests, the possibility for more power or simply the supply of arms.”

References and Further Reading:

The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan - a report published by Christian Aid.

Sudan: The Human Price of Oil – a report by Amnesty International.

Sudan, Oil and Human Rights: A Paper by Human Rights Watch.

See also “Oil and the Civil War in Sudan” in the Yale Insider.

Peace Agreements

The “Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Sudan People’s Liberation Army” is comprised of six separate agreements:

■ The Machakos Protocol, IGAD “Secretariat on Peace in the Sudan”, Machakos, Kenya, 20 July 2002

■ Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, Naivasha, Kenya, 25 September 2003;

■ Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM on Power Sharing, Naivasha, Kenya, 26 May 2004;

■ Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, Navaisha, Kenya, 7 January 2005;

■ Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, 26 May 2004;

■ Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, Naivasha, Kenya, 26 May 2004

Of the peace accords, the most important political document is the Machakos Protocol. This provides that there will be a six-year interim period to implement the peace agreement (Part B, 2.2), which will be monitored by an Independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission (Part B, 2.4).

The composition of the Commission will consist of equal representation from Khartoum and the SLPA/M. This will include representatives from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Italy, Norway, the UK, the US, and “any other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the parties” (Part B, 2.4.1).

These parties will work with the Commission “with a view to improving the institutions and arrangements created under the Agreement and making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of south Sudan” (Part B, 2.4.2). After six years:

“…there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GOS [Government of Sudan] and the SLPM/A, for the people of south Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement: or to vote for secession” (Part B, 2.5)

Part C of the Protocol concerns the structure of government. The national government is to continue to function as a sovereign state at the national level, but when passing laws it shall take into account “the religious and cultural diversity of the Sudanese people” (Part C, 3.2.1).

Most importantly, the protocol provides for two separate systems of law in the country: sharia and custom. Only states “outside Southern Sudan shall have as its source of legislation Shari’a” (Part C, 3.2.2). In the south:

“Nationally enacted legislation … shall have as its source of legislation popular consensus, the values and customs of the people of Sudan including their traditions and religious beliefs, having regards to Sudan’s diversity” (Part C, 3.2.3).

On state and religion, the Protocol recognises that “Sudan is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual country … religion shall not be used as a divisive factor.” Most importantly, the protocol provides the following:

“6.2 There shall be freedom of belief, worship and conscience for followers of all religions or beliefs or customs and no one shall be discriminated against on such grounds.

6.3 Eligibility for public office, including the presidency, public service and the enjoyment of all rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, beliefs or customs.

6.4 All personal and family matters including marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession, and affiliation may be governed by the personal laws (including Shari’a or other religious laws, customs of traditions) of those concerned.”

In the Agreement on Wealth Sharing, the parties agree to establish an independent National Petroleum Commission which will reach its decisions “by consensus” (Part B, 3.2). It is agreed that the guiding principles for sharing oil revenue “should balance the needs for national development and reconstruction of Southern Sudan” (5.1.1.). What then follows is a rather detailed framework of how this will be achieved. Suffice to note:

“After the payment to the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and to the oil producing states / regions, fifty percent (50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan shall be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as of the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National Government and States in Northern Sudan” (5.6).

The agreements which make up the North-South Peace Deal clearly aim to tackle the root causes of Sudan’s civil war (race, culture, religion, identity, power, and control of natural resources including oil).