



Arab Media Watch
for objective British coverage of Arab issues

Study: The Media & Darfur

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Introduction

In July 2006, veteran award-winning journalist Jonathan Steele gave an address at the Royal United Services Institute, London, entitled "How the Media prolonged the war in Darfur." In it, he outlined eight mistakes committed by the media in covering the region which have prolonged the conflict artificially. He laid out his argument:

"The media, in my view, have consistently failed to cover Darfur properly. Reporters have made repeated mistakes, and not been honest with their readers. Commentators have ignored or slanted key aspects of the conflict. Even though much of their work has been well-intentioned, aiming to alert the world to the tragedies of Darfur in the hope of getting them stopped, I believe their work has had the opposite effect. Bad journalism has helped to prolong the war."

Steele continued:

"I believe that the media's role in making heroes out of the rebels and overlooking their misdeeds, as well as in constantly calling for sanctions on Khartoum or even military intervention, have had a malign effect. In my view it encouraged the rebels to be more intransigent in Abuja than they would otherwise have been. They felt confident that if they refused to sign but held out for more, they could have the media's support. As it is, two of the three groups refused to sign the deal, and it was little short of a miracle that Minni Minawi, the leader of the largest military faction, eventually did sign it."

Jonathan Steele, "How the Media prolonged the war in Darfur," speech at the Royal United Services Institute, London, 6 July 2006.

This document lists the eight mistakes Steele outlined, and provides further corroborative evidence to support his thesis from authoritative and recognised individuals or bodies on Darfur.

Mistake One: The War's Origins

"Mistake number one was not to get the war's origins right...The fact that hostilities began with a rebel attack on the Sudanese air force base at El Fasher in February 2003 and the deaths of dozens of soldiers was usually not mentioned..."

In discussing Darfur, it makes more sense to discuss the *current* conflict. There has been a long history of both peace and animosity in the region, and the present crisis is not the first time groups have taken up arms. Some 25 conflicts of varying scales have taken place - and resolved locally - since 1966.

However, a major difference in the current conflict is its centre-periphery character, which was ignited by a rebel attack on government buildings. Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, academics at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales in Paris respectively, write:

"In early 2003, after several years of simmering violence, rebel groups in Darfur launched a full-scale rebellion against Sudanese government targets. Two groups emerged. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) enjoyed early successes, capturing el-Fasher airport. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was more developed politically than the SLA but less significant militarily."

Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups

<http://tinyurl.com/6gq69y>

The known history of Darfur is complex and goes back many centuries, although not much is known about the region before the establishment of The Fur Sultanate in 1650. However, in recent times, many factors in Darfuri life have become aggravated, precipitating the conflict.

The environment of Darfur is fragile and can be harsh, it has been under increasing pressure in recent times, and has seen severe drought and famine (e.g. the 1984-85 famine in which some 100,000 people died).

Therefore, competition for land and access to resources have become exacerbating factors as the traditional mechanisms for local resolution of disputes have slowly been eroded by the over-centralisation of the decision-making process. R.S O'Fahey, professor of African history at the University of Bergen, Norway, writes in the International Herald Tribune:

"One of the root causes of the present crisis goes back to the 1980s, when prolonged droughts accelerated the desertification of northern and central Darfur and led to pressure on water and grazing resources as the camel nomads were forced to move southwards. Conflicts over wells that in earlier times had been settled with spears or mediation became much more intractable in an era awash with guns."

R.S. O'Fahey, Darfur: A complex ethnic reality with a long history, 15 May 2004

http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/05/15/edofahey_ed3_.php

However, the traditional Darfurian way of life has been disappearing for some time. In fact, the distinction between 'nomads' and 'sedentary farmers' frequently made by the media in

describing Darfur is an increasingly blurry one, something that has been sped up by the current crisis. James Morton, a consultant on African development and adviser to the British government, writes:

"There is no real dividing line between farmers and nomads. Many Baggara Arabs, traditionally perceived as nomadic herders, are settled farmers. Conversely, some of the non-arab [sic] Fur move with their cattle. Even more strikingly, tribal and even ethnic boundaries can also be fluid. Alliances can develop to the extent that groups eventually change tribe."

James Morton, Resources, Development and Politics in Darfur, September 2004

<http://tinyurl.com/5hmln8>

Furthermore, failures on the part of both local and central government have been a factor. Alex de Waal, programme director at the Social Science Research Council, and fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University, writes:

"Much of the present conflict...has its origins in land rights and the shortcomings of local administration. But central government, too, is implicated in Darfur's plight, with neglect and manipulation playing equal parts."

"Within Darfur, Arabs and non-Arabs alike have been marginalised, and it is Darfur's tragedy that the leaders of these groups have not made common cause in the face of Khartoum's indifference."

"Unrelenting poverty has been transformed into violence by misgovernment and imported racisms."

Alex de Waal, Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, London Review of Books, 5 August 2004

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/waal01_.html

One further factor to mention is the wider regional context. The UN writes:

"Other factors have come into play including repeated episodes of drought and famine, and the impact of wider regional conflict including the Chadian civil war, the Libyan Chadian war, and the north south civil conflict in Sudan."

UN, The History And Origins Of The Current Conflict In Darfur, February 2005

<http://www.htspe.com/pdfs/ConfDar.pdf>

The longer-term context is crucial in understanding the dynamics of Darfur; that the media rarely ventures earlier than February 2003 is a hindrance to a fuller, better-informed understanding of the conflict.

Mistake Two: Religion

"Mistake number two was to transfer the template of Sudan's North-South war to Darfur. So we heard a good deal about how the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Khartoum was trying to impose Islam and sharia on Darfur just as it had done for years on the Nilotic peoples of south Sudan. It took months before most of the media discovered that almost everyone in Darfur is Muslim."

The vast majority of the population in Darfur are Muslims, so differences of religion play no part in the present Darfur conflict. The convenience of applying aspects of the North-South conflict onto Darfur is to blame for missing this basic point.

"It should be pointed out that all the tribes of Darfur share the same religion (Islam), and while some of the tribes do possess their own language, Arabic is generally spoken."

The UN Report of the International Commission of Inquiry, January 2005

http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf

Most Darfuris follow Sufism, which is thought to have arrived from West Africa, contrary to the assumption that it arrived from the Nile region of Sudan.

Mistake Three: Arabs vs Africans

"Mistake number three, a variant of mistake number two, was to portray the war as one between Arab and Africans. OK, the war wasn't about religion. It was about race...This simplistic Arab versus African template ignored the complexity of Darfur's tribal structure and the long history of tension between the various tribes and ethnicities. It also ignored the long history of tribal reconciliation mechanisms which had managed over decades to keep the peace in Darfur or restore it when it was occasionally broken."

One major feature of Western reporting of Darfur has been the labelling of the combatants as 'Arab' and 'African'. However, this over-simplification misses the mark by quite some margin, and amounts to the needless polarisation of the combatants that contributes to the intractability of the conflict. Victor Tanner, of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, writes:

"The conflict in Darfur is often portrayed in the West as African versus Arab. This is inaccurate. Ethnic boundaries in Darfur are fluid and flexible...There is a long history of political, economic and social cooperation. 'Arabs' and 'Africans' are not at war with each other in Darfur."

Victor Tanner, Rule of Lawlessness: Roots and Repercussions of the Darfur Crisis, January 2005

www.sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/sudan?a=pdf&d=Dunepd257.1&dl=1

Alex de Waal, programme director at the Social Science Research Council, and fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University, spells out the attendant fallacy of the 'Arab vs African' position:

"It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the depiction of 'Arabs' killing 'Africans' in Darfur conjures up, in the mind of a non-Sudanese (including many people in sub-Saharan Africa), a picture of bands of light-skinned Arabs marauding among villages of peaceable black-skinned people of indeterminate religion. In the current context in which 'Arabs' are identified, in the popular western and sub-Saharan African press, with the instigators of terrorism, it readily labels Darfur's non-Arabs as victims."

Alex de Waal, Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement, 10 December 2004

<http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/hornofafrica/dewaal/>

Ethnically, Darfurian Arabs are indistinguishable from any other inhabitant - and are Arabs in the sense of Bedouin, desert nomad - but form a politically distinct group. De Waal offers this clarification of the relationship between Darfur's Arabs and non-Arabs:

"From the viewpoint of Southern Sudan (and indeed east Africa), 'African' and 'Arab' are polar opposites. From the viewpoint of Darfur and its 'Sudanic' orientation, 'Arab' is merely one subset of 'African'. Darfurians had no difficulty with multiple identities, and indeed would have defined their African kingdom as encompassing indigenous Arabs, both Bedouins and culturally literate Arabs."

Alex de Waal, Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement, 10 December 2004

<http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/hornofafrica/dewaal/>

This shared history of both groups is crucial to conceiving the current conflict. However, due to the recurrence in the media of such a mutually antagonistic position, polarisation of the sides in the conflict has occurred, further complicating the task of rebuilding Darfur once settlement has been achieved.

A peaceable, post-conflict identity stressing common Darfurian history and traditions of all its people will be crucial to the sustainability of any peace accord, but the added (and recent) imposition of division - the 'Arab' and 'African' labels - as central factors in the conflict will hinder this process.

Mistake Four: Economic Roots

"Mistake number four was to ignore the economic roots of the conflict...If the media did not understand or bother to report the context of the war in Darfur, they were equally bad at failing to report the options for peace..."

In the decades since independence, the peripheral regions of Sudan have not been equally developed. No power was devolved and few development projects (health, education, amenities) were apportioned anything like the way Khartoum benefited; decisions on distant matters were taken centrally, essentially by outsiders. This has created an economic angle to Darfur, with the people feeling the effects of marginalisation.

As noted earlier, the unforgiving climate and rapidly disappearing way of life made life very difficult for Darfur's inhabitants, something which affected the younger generations more acutely. Karin Willemse, lecturer at the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, University of Leiden, notes:

"In these deteriorating conditions of deprivation and despair among nomadic and sedentary young men 'without a future,' weapons form an easy and immediate satisfaction in the quest for respect, self-identity, and a sense of control. The label genocide seems therefore to miss the point: apart from its legal complexity, the conflict has its base in socio-economic and political factors with a far more complicated history."

Karin Willemse, "Darfur in War: The Politicization of Ethnic Identities?" ISIM Review, Spring 2005

http://www.isim.nl/files/Review_15/Review_15-14.pdf

The lesson of examining the economic roots of the conflict - and not wasting time and resources on constructing ideological roots - lies in the redressing of the economic imbalance and development as a means to sustain peace. Consequently, the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 pays particular attention to power- and wealth-sharing as part of the settlement, in addition to political representation and compensation.

However, economic inequality is a motivational factor in the conflict, but not the most dominant one.

"The main economic problem in Darfur has historically been neglect, not exploitation...Economic inequality and neglect was used by Darfur's rebels as a justification for their rebellion, but the engine of that insurrection was local strife, albeit some of it encouraged by Khartoum."

Alex de Waal, Sudan: What Kind of State? What Kind of Crisis? April 2007

<http://www.crisisstates.com/download/op/op2.DeWaal.pdf>

Mistake Five: The Peace Process

"Mistake number five by the media was to ignore the peace process. Instead the bulk of the op-ed pieces and comments was to demand Western intervention and sanctions on Khartoum as though there was no peace track on offer...The trouble was that at various points the rebels walked out or refused to return after a break."

It was seven rounds of peace talks that finally led to the negotiations that took place in Abuja in 2006. It resulted in the most significant attempt at peace yet, the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed (by two parties) in Abuja, Nigeria on 5 May 2006.

The way was prepared in November 2005 at the seventh round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur (also held in Abuja) aimed at a comprehensive peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the main rebel groups in Darfur: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, and the Justice and Equality Movement.

The text of the agreement itself is fairly dense, with 87 pages of text and 19 additional pages of implementation annexes. It was signed by the government and Minni Minawi, leader of the SLA/M, who then became special adviser to the president.

That Minawi signed (reluctantly) was seen as something of a miracle, but was a move that precipitated increased factionalisation among the rebel groups and highlighted division in the opposition. Minawi is now an isolated figure, both in respect of the government and his traditional support base.

The DPA can be accessed in full at:

http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/DPA_ABUJA-5-05-06-withSignatures.pdf

In some ways, that the DPA was signed by only a small proportion of the rebel movements made the situation in Darfur worse. The International Crisis Group notes:

"The document has serious flaws, and two of the three rebel delegations did not accept it. Fighting between rebel and government forces is down somewhat but violence is worse in some areas due to clashes between SLA factions, banditry, and inter-tribal feuds, while the Chad border remains volatile."

International Crisis Group, Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement, 20 June 2006

<http://tinyurl.com/5c2au5>

It is generally thought among observers that time limits imposed on the participants acted as a hindrance to a positive outcome at Abuja. Furthermore, the sides involved were little inclined to compromise on their positions.

The most recent attempt at holding peace talks came in October 2007 when talks were held in Sirte, Libya, following an African Union / UN-mediated three-phase roadmap that was presented in June 2007.

Phase one and two were preliminary moves in July and August 2007, aimed at unifying both the rebel groups and the number of initiatives that existed to bring about negotiations (Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, the US, EU, and various NGOs had made abortive attempts to do so), and unifying the rebels' position in advance.

The negotiations themselves began on 27 October 2007, aimed at creating broad and inclusive consultative mechanisms in Darfur whereby the diverse voices of its constituents could be heard. This was first established in the form of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation stipulated in the DPA (2006). Key rebel leaders did not attend the talks.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7065960.stm>

Mistake Six: Rebel Intransigence

"Media mistake number six was to overlook the problems caused by the rebels. All the blame for the lack of progress at the peace talks was put on the government."

It is important to note that blame must be shared, not heaped on one side in particular. However, the frequent demands for Western intervention and sanctions on Khartoum miss the point that in the absence of any agreement between the sides involved, there would be no peace for the peacekeepers to keep. For this to be realised, all involved must be present at negotiations.

Laurie Nathan, research fellow in the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics, writes:

"Divisions among the insurgents inhibited progress and precluded flexibility. The rebels were unable to speak with one voice and at times even refused to meet in the same room... The balance of power reinforced intransigence. The armed groups - militarily weak, unconfident intellectually and frightened of being outmanoeuvred in negotiations - faced a strong and sophisticated adversary. Intransigence is typically the refuge of weak parties in negotiations."

Laurie Nathan, Failings of the DPA, 2006

<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/dpa-failings.php>

The continued intransigence of rebel groups also serves to frustrate not only progress, but also international mediators, whose impatience at the lack of progress grows. As a result, sanctions on Sudan have been tightened. Some are UN-imposed and dating from March 2005, which involved strengthening the arms embargo and imposing travel bans and asset freezes on individuals.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4392605.stm>

US President George Bush detailed the tightening of US sanctions on Sudan in May 2007:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070529.html>

However, both the US and UK now accept that the rebels must accept responsibility. Reuters reported in March 2008 that the US and British ambassadors to the UN agreed that punishments for the lack of progress in Darfur must be directed at both the rebels and the government.

<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N11355689.htm>

Mistake Seven: Rebel Factionalisation

"Media mistake number seven was to ignore the splits on the rebels' side. It was not until two of the three rebel movements refused to sign the Abuja deal in May (2006) that many reporters woke up to the fact that the rebels were not united..."

The rebel groups did not resemble a unified group, even at the start of the conflict. The splits among them in recent years have become increasingly more numerous and intractable. Factionalisation has been such that even those closely involved in monitoring the conflict cannot name or number those at arms, something severely hindering the peace process.

Those who today form the 'rebels' have never historically been considered 'brothers-in-arms' or ideologically homogenous, a fact that generally escapes consideration in the reporting of Darfur. Alex de Waal, programme director at the Social Science Research Council, and fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University, notes:

"The Darfur rebels' history is important and also little documented. They spring from convergent resistance movements based among Darfur's three largest non-Arab groups, the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit."

Alex de Waal, Review of Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, 1 September 2005

http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/hornofafrica/ambiguous_genocide/

Karen Willemse, lecturer at the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, University of Leiden, notes the more fluid history of interaction between these tribes, and highlights the failure in recent times of traditional inter-tribal peacekeeping mechanisms:

"In the early 1990s, conflicts over scarce resources concerned predominantly Fur and Zaghawa, groups that have now become allies in the conflict. The failure of traditional negotiation and peace keeping mechanisms, such as tribal reconciliation conferences - the last one between Fur and Arabs took place only in 1989, to no avail - proved to be not only due to the politicization of ethnic identities. Of importance as well was the discontent within the ethnic groups."

Karin Willemse, "Darfur in War: The Politicization of Ethnic Identities?" ISIM Review, Spring 2005

http://www.isim.nl/files/Review_15/Review_15-14.pdf

The splits within the rebel groups continue to be a serious issue:

"The rebel factions have been unable to maintain a unified focus and have instead descended into a spiral of infighting and splintering, exasperating outside attempts to bring them together."

International Crisis Group, Darfur's New Security Reality, Africa Report no. 134, 26 November 2007

<http://tinyurl.com/6dluj7>

As Amnesty International confirms:

"Hundreds of people have been killed in 2007 in fighting between ethnic groups. As arms have proliferated, disputes that in the past would be resolved by traditional reconciliation processes have led to mass killings. The fiercest attacks have been by the Northern Rizeigat on the Tarjem. Both groups identify themselves as Arabs."

Amnesty International, DARFUR: 'WHEN WILL THEY PROTECT US?' Civilians trapped by violence in Sudan, September 2007

<http://tinyurl.com/5px2xw>

Mistake Eight: Rebels and Humanitarian Problems

"Media mistake number eight was to ignore the humanitarian problems caused by the rebels. In their eagerness to portray the struggle in simple terms as good guys versus bad guys, attacks by the rebels on aid convoys were not covered. Attacks by the rebels on villages which also displaced thousands of Darfurians also went unreported."

It has been recognised by NGOs that rebels have indeed been responsible for attacks on humanitarian workers and Darfurians.

"Rebel DPA signatories, particularly the Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), have been responsible for attacks on civilians, humanitarians, the AU mission (AMIS) and some of the violence in the internally displaced person (IDP) camps."

"Humanitarian agencies, which have helped ensure the survival of over four million war-affected Darfurians, find themselves the direct target of violence. With attacks against them having risen by 150 per cent over the previous year, they have been forced to pull out of many areas and reduced to providing assistance via 'in and out' operations in some areas, often by helicopter. Violence against them comes from all sides: government militias, non-signatory rebels, SLA/MM forces and IDPs themselves. With the proliferation of rebel movements, it is difficult for humanitarian agencies to coordinate aid delivery; because of the insecurity, nearly half a million people are inaccessible to them."

International Crisis Group, Darfur's New Security Reality, Africa Report no. 134, 26 November 2007

<http://tinyurl.com/6dluj7>

This is corroborated by Amnesty International:

"A number of armed opposition groups, including the JEM and the various SLA factions such as SLA/Minawi, have committed abuses including kidnapping, detaining and sometimes killing opponents and attacking humanitarian convoys."

Amnesty International, Darfur: 'When Will They Protect Us?' Civilians trapped by violence in Sudan, 13 September 2007

<http://tinyurl.com/5px2xw>

Further corroboration comes from Human Rights Watch:

"Rebel groups have conducted attacks on humanitarian convoys and aid workers that have diverted food assistance and hindered access to the population in need. This interference appears to be increasing."

Human Rights Watch, "Rebel Attacks on Humanitarian Agencies and Workers"

http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudan0506/6.htm#_Toc134524599

Selected Resources

Good gateways

Riftvalley.net: <http://www.riftvalley.net/index.php?view=iresources>

Sudanarchive.net: <http://www.sudanarchive.net/>

United Nations / African Union

UN's Sudan gateway:

<http://www.unsudanig.org/>

The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur, January 2005:

http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf

The Darfur Peace Agreement (2006) can be accessed in full at:

http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/DPA_ABUJA-5-05-06-withSignatures.pdf

Site of the joint African Union / UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur UNAMID Mandate

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/>

UN, "The History And Origins Of The Current Conflict In Darfur," February 2005

<http://tinyurl.com/3q7esz>

Blogs / Fora

"Making Sense of Darfur" from the Social Science Research Council:

<http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/category/darfur/>

"Africa Policy Forum" from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies:

<http://forums.csis.org/africa/?cat=3>

"Contemporary Conflicts" from the Social Science Research Council:

<http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/>

"Darfur Peace Process" from the Chr Michelsen Institute:

<http://www.cmi.no/sudan/?id=33&Darfur-Peace-Process>

Articles

Alex de Waal, "Tragedy in Darfur: On understanding and ending the horror," Boston Review, October / November 2004

<http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/dewaal.html>

Alex de Waal, "I will not sign," London Review of Books, 30 November 2006

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n23/waal01_.html

Alex de Waal, "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap," London Review of Books, 5 August 2004

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/waal01_.html

John Ryle, "Disaster in Darfur," New York Review of Books, 12 August 2004

<http://middleeastinfo.org/article4650.html>

Academic articles

Johan Broshé, "Darfur: Dimensions and Dilemmas of a Complex Situation," Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2008

<http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/info/Sud%202.pdf>

Alex de Waal, "Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement," 10 December 2004

<http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/hornofafrica/dewaal/>

Alex de Waal "Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: the Politics of State Non-Cooperation" (chapter 4), Royal African Society, March 2008

<http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/ICC%20in%20Africa.pdf>

Human Security Baseline Assessment, "No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy," December 2006

<http://tinyurl.com/6gq69y>

James Morton, "Conflict in Darfur: A Different Perspective," June 2004

<http://www.htspe.com/pdfs/ConfDar.pdf>

James Morton, "Managing Political and Economic Claims to Land in Darfur," February 2008

<http://www.jfmorton.co.uk/pdfs/PolEconDfurLand.pdf>

James Morton, "Resources, Development and Politics in Darfur," September 2004

<http://tinyurl.com/5hmln8>

James Morton, "Darfur Compendium: A Review of the Geographical, Historical, and Economic Background to Development in the Region," HTSPE, 2005

<http://www.jfmorton.co.uk/pdfs/A%20Darfur%20Compendium.pdf>

Sara Pantuliano, "The land question: Sudan's peace nemesis," Overseas Development Institute, December 2007

www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/wplandsudan.pdf

Victor Tanner, "Rule of Lawlessness: Roots and Repercussions of the Darfur Crisis," January 2005

www.sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/sudan?a=pdf&d=Dunepd257.1&dl=1

Victor Tanner and Jerome Tubiana, "Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur's Rebel Groups," July 2007

<http://tinyurl.com/6gq69y>

Karin Willemse, "Darfur in War: The Politicization of Ethnic Identities?" Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World Review, Spring 2005

http://www.isim.nl/files/Review_15/Review_15-14.pdf

Books

Sharif Harir, "'Arab belt' versus 'African belt': Ethno-political conflict in Dar Fur and the regional cultural factors," in *Short-cut to decay. The case of the Sudan*, ed. Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994):pp.153-161

Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: Short History of a Long War* (London: Zed Books, 2005, 152pp.)

Alex de Waal, *Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan*, Oxford University Press, 2004